ince the 1990s, South american regional organizations have adopted, formalized, and reinforced additional provisions to their constitutive treaties, sanctioning members that do not respect democracy. These "democracy clauses" have played a central role in recent episodes of political unrest, either by being applied formally-as when mercosur (mercado común del Sur) and unasur (unión de naciones Suramericanas) suspended Paraguay's membership rights in June 2012, and when mercosur did the same to venezuela in august 2017-or merely by being invoked, as during the impeachment procedures against Brazil's President dilma Rousseff in may 2016. far from being an exception, the South american organizations' actions are part of a wider trend, as intergovernmental organizations in the rest of the americas, europe, and africa, have also adopted formal democracy clauses. * This article results from the project "institutional design in comparative Regional integration" (indecRi) (cSo2016-76130-P), https://www.researchgate.net/project/institutional-design -in-comparative-Regional-integration-indecRi, which is supported by a grant from the Spanish Research agency. Research commenced at the Robert Schuman center for advanced Studies (rscas) at the european university institute (eui) in 2015 with a grant from the european union-latin america and caribbean (eu-lac) foundation, contract eXP03c074cea-006/2014. We are grateful to rscas director Brigid laffan for hosting the project within the global governance Program. Stefano Palestini conducted part of the research at the Kolleg-forschergruppe (kfg) "The Transformative Power of europe" working group, hosted by the free university of Berlin. The kfg is funded by the german Research foundation (dfg). earlier versions of this article were presented at the institute for Public goods and Policies in madrid, february 2016; the international Studies association annual convention in atlanta, march 2016; and the eui in florence, december 2016. We thank all those who participated in these events for their comments. We also thank daniela vintila for her careful discussion of this article, Jon Pevehouse for his detailed criticism of an earlier version, and the three anonymous World Politics reviewers for their very helpful suggestions.
1 following the collins and merriam-Webster dictionaries, we define tutelage as the state of being under the supervision or guardianship of a tutor.
This trend presents a puzzle. a priori, states are eager to retain their sovereignty unfettered. But by adopting clauses of this kind, states subject their sovereignty to monitoring and, possibly to sanctions. This article addresses this conundrum by explaining why states decide to formalize binding and enforceable democracy clauses.
We argue that South american governments formalized democracy clauses in reaction to concrete domestic threats, and with the specific goal of reducing political uncertainty and ensuring government survival. going beyond the existing literature, we also argue that governments have asymmetric perceptions of the usefulness and enforceability of democracy clauses, and that those perceptions crucially influence decisions to adopt formal clauses. When decision makers support the adoption of democracy clauses, they take into consideration the perceived stability of their own government and that of other member states, as well as the likelihood of future enforcement of the clauses against their own country. governments that perceive themselves as unstable thus support the adoption and formalization of democracy clauses to the extent that the provisions shield their own regimes. moreover, they perceive that other states within the regional organization can effectively enforce these provisions if it is demanded of them. conversely, governments that perceive themselves as either stable or too big to be sanctioned support the formalization of democracy clauses because they expect to be the enforcers-not the targets-of those clauses. We argue that the latter governments understand democracy clauses as tutelage mechanisms 1 for governments perceived as unstable. motivation for tutelage stems from a variety of reasons, such as the desire to protect regional stability, to project the image of being a regional leader, or to defend ideologically like-minded governments. But despite these motivations, the structural logic of tutelage remains: some governments perceive themselves as enforcers, while others perceive themselves and are perceived by others as requiring protection.
The literature on international institutions for human rights and democracy protection has overlooked the importance of tutelage to explain the formalization of international commitments. Theorizing based on the european case argues that the agreement between consolidated democracies and new democracies explains the formalization of, for instance, human rights regimes. But in regional environments in which almost all states transited to democracy simultaneously, such as South america, considerations of stability and enforcement capability deriving from structural conditions like size gain particular salience. The existing literature also fails to note that as opposed to human rights protection through supranational courts, democracy clauses are intergovernmental provisions. lacking delegation to an agent above the state, enforcement of these provisions relies on the states' own capabilities. Thus governments' expectations of the capability to provide tutelage play a crucial role in decisions to adopt formal democracy clauses.
in this article, we systematically test competing hypotheses to explain the adoption and formalization of democracy clauses. We do so by following the epistemological and methodological requirements of process-tracing analysis. 2 We use evidence drawn from interviews with decision makers from two South american regional organizations, mercosur and unasur, which have formalized and enforced their democracy clauses over the past two decades. These interviews reveal the motivations of the decision makers who participated in the design and adoption of the clauses. The relatively young age of the two organizations allowed us to contact the protagonists in this institutionalization process, and to construct an original corpus of thirty-six interviews with top-level decision makers, including former heads of state and foreign ministers.
our findings explain the design of these instruments in the specific case of these South american regional organizations. The configuration of circumstances permits us to draw some theoretical insights that will orient future research. But generalization beyond this case will require further testing and evidence from other regional organizations.
We develop the argument as follows. The next section discusses alternative theoretical explanations for the adoption of democracy clauses, drawing on broader literature about the design of international institutions for democracy and human rights protection. 3 We derive testable hypotheses from each theory. The section after that presents the research design, case selection, and methodology, and tests the hypotheses against empirical data. We then discuss the implications for theory and future research. The conclusion summarizes the thesis.
theoretical explanation of democracy clauses in regional organizations democracy clauses comprise a set of rules and procedures formalized into an international legal instrument (typically a treaty or protocol) through which international organizations require states to be democracies and to remain so as a condition of membership. These provisions define-with varying degrees of precision-activation and verification procedures, as well as sanctions (economic and diplomatic sanctions and, in some cases, suspension of membership), should any member state breach the democracy condition. although the trend for intergovernmental organizations adopting democracy clauses started immediately after the end of the cold War, scholars have only recently begun to discuss the phenomenon systematically. early academic work on democracy protection and regional integration emerged in parallel with the processes of democratization that were unfolding in latin america and eastern europe. 5 The fact that regions with a greater number of democratic states correlated significantly with democratic consolidation 6 paved the way for more systematic attempts to explain why governments agree to delegate democracy-protection competences to intergovernmental and supranational organizations, and to define what effects this has on democratic transition and consolidation.
7
There is a growing number of studies on the adoption and enforcement of democratic norms at the regional level, but few try to test competing theories. furthermore, most studies apply starkly different hypothesis-testing methods, ranging from large-n probabilistic analysis to individual case studies, which complicates the assessment of the explanatory leverage of competing approaches, and thus impedes theory building. This article assesses and refines existing theories by deriving hypotheses suitable for testing through a process-tracing analysis.
We focus on three main competing explanations for the adoption of democracy clauses: diffusion mechanisms, societal demand, and regime survival. Scholars of the design of international institutions, specifically those concerned with the institutional design of international democracy and human rights regimes, often apply these well-established 4 closa, Palestini céspedes, and castillo ortiz 2016. 5 Whitehead 2001; franck 1992; dabène 2004 dabène . 6 Pevehouse 2005 mansfield and Pevehouse 2006; Ribeiro Hoffmann and van der vleuten 2007; legler and Tieku 2010; Börzel and van Hüllen 2015; genna and Hiroi 2015. approaches.
8 But we add a fourth approach, based on the notion of tutelage. Taken together, these four explanatory accounts conflate two underlying theoretical dimensions-normative versus rational action logics on the one hand, and extraregional versus intraregional drivers on the other 9 -which leaves us confident that the approaches are comprehensive. We formulate hypotheses for each theory and test them against the empirical evidence. diffusion as early as the 1990s, and motivated by the third wave of democratization, international legal scholars and institutional sociologists posited the emergence of a global repertoire of norms that provide models and guidelines for emulation by states and organizations. 10 Thomas franck argues that internationally shared expectations would positively reinforce the interests at stake in gaining legitimacy through the adoption of principles, rules, and democratic procedures implemented and formalized through multilateral and regional institutions.
11 from a sociological institutionalist perspective, John meyer points out that the existence of any such international standards provides a script for the emergence of a "world society." 12 more recently, Tanja Börzel and vera van Hüllen draw on meyer's insights to argue that regional organizations adopt and adapt liberal normative standards, such as respect for democracy, human rights, and the rule of law, which contribute to patching together a "global script." 13 in this theoretical account, diffusion doesn't result from a specific agency; rather, it comes about because of the normative appeal of global values that lead governments to accept binding international norms and standards.
14 Hence, franck sees compliance with international law as a function of the normative acceptance of international rules, which in turn reflects their consistency with domestic values. 15 We can translate this normative influence into our first diffusion hypothesis:
8 See farer 1996; moravcsik 2000; Hawkins and Shaw 2008; levitt 2006; Simmons, dobbin, and garrett 2006; Pevehouse 2005; Pevehouse 2016 . 9 Risse 2016; Börzel 2016. 10 meyer and Rowan 1977; Huntington 1991; fox 1992; franck 1992; crawford 1994; Boli and Thomas 1999; Rich 2001; marks 2011. 11 This hypothesis presupposes a nondirected diffusion process led by the emulation of norms in which domestic actors play a central role. alternatively, external actors may play a prominent causal role as diffusers of norms and institutions. The existence of incentives, which typically take the form of conditionality, is the key causal mechanism in these diffusion processes. for instance, extraregional actors may reward the introduction of a democracy clause with market access (say, through a preferential trade agreement), financial or technical assistance, or development aid. They can also exert direct influence by supporting or empowering domestic actors to push for the adoption of certain norms and governance standards. 16 in a different interpretation, external actors may promote certain institutions and norms because they fit the universal values adhered to by those actors. in such cases, external actors must engage in processes of persuasion and socialization 17 to convince intraregional actors that adopting those norms is appropriate.
18 Socialization and persuasion don't entail rewards and sanctions; they're based on argument and justification, and require sustained interaction between the promoters of a norm and its recipients. 19 The eu's external policies, which have typically included democracy promotion 20 in bilateral agreements, exemplify direct-influence diffusion, particularly in the case of its strategic partnership and association agreements with South american countries. 21 in both interpretations of the reasons external actors promote certain norms, formalization happens precisely because of the agency of those actors, and this inspires the formulation of a direct-influence diffusion hypothesis: -H1b. decision makers formalize democracy clauses because of the influence (through incentives or persuasion) of extraregional actors. 16 Schimmelfennig, engert, and Knobel 2003; Risse 2016. 17 21 The first human rights and democracy clause appeared in the 1990 eec-argentina cooperation agreement, at argentina's request. Similar provisions appeared in the agreements with uruguay (1991), Paraguay (1992), and Brazil (1992) ; in the cooperation agreements with mercosur (1995) and central america (1993 and 2003) ; and in the andean Pact (1993 and .
societal demand focusing on internal or endogenous processes, the most prominent explanation of formalization of democracy-protection clauses argues that national decision makers agree to tie their own hands through formal commitments, such as democracy clauses, because they expect those commitments to be useful to their own goals, perhaps solving issuespecific problems.
22 But beyond this basic agreement, the approaches differ on the mechanism that causes governments to tie their hands through a democracy clause. a first approach focuses on the demands of societal, mostly economic, constituencies. following the liberal tradition of new institutionalism, this approach contends that states adhere to international organizations to make credible for societal constituencies their commitment to preserve pro-market policies. Through membership in these organizations, states lock in the preferences of those domestic constituencies-mainly firms and economic elites-that see democracy as a better regime to protect their economic interests and rights, especially property rights and liberalization reforms crucial for doing business.
23 domestic actors perceive international agreements as powerful tools to reduce transaction costs and to commit credibly to liberal economic policies. 24 By and large, the literature hasn't specifically theorized on the reasons for the formalization of democracy clauses, though gaspare genna and Taeko Hiroi are an exception.
25 accordingly, we propose the following societaldemand hypothesis: -H2. decision makers formalize democracy clauses to respond to domestic demands for locking in liberal pro-market preferences.
regime survival a different body of scholarship suggests that decision makers seek to reduce political uncertainty and thereby lock in regime survival rather than liberal policies. The literature on international regimes for democracy and human rights protection focuses on how membership in a regional organization can help states dissuade potential domestic destabilizers. By acceding to regional organizations, national democratic 22 coglianese 2000; Koremenos, lipson, and Snidal 2001. 23 goldstein 1998; mansfield and milner 1999; mansfield, milner, and Rosendorff 2002; Pevehouse 2005; mansfield and Pevehouse 2006; genna and Hiroi 2015 . 24 mansfield and milner 1999 , 605-606. 25 genna and Hiroi 2015 actors raise the cost of potential disruptive acts, thus discouraging other actors who may be motivated to seek power outside the democratic rules and procedures. 26 Surprisingly, this logic isn't exclusive to democratic regimes: scholars of the international aspects of authoritarianism identify a similar trend, finding that authoritarian regimes also engage with regional organizations and alliances to protect themselves from potential internal or external destabilizers.
27 as in the case of societal demands, these arguments are notably indifferent to whether regional organizations adopt certain provisions, such as clauses and sanctions. Thus membership in an organization can be directly linked with the outcome-that is, regime survival.
28 despite the lack of specific attention to formalized clauses, and in parallel with the previous hypothesis, we can infer from this theory that governments will push for the formalization of clauses and sanctions to raise the cost of destabilizing behavior, thus further reducing uncertainty and ultimately increasing the likelihood of regime survival.
furthermore, as threats against a certain regime become more immediate, the government's preference to enhance domestic stability becomes more intense-and hence, the pressure mounts to adopt provisions at the international level.
29 These threats alter the calculations of decision makers, enhancing the probability that the preference for a collective commitment, such as a democracy clause, will outweigh the potential losses of sovereignty. in other words, governments influenced by domestic threats will be prone to tie their hands and increase the odds of regime survival.
-H3. decision makers adopt democracy clauses as a reaction to domestic threats. tutelage in regard to the regime-survival hypothesis, the literature overlooks a crucial theoretical issue. The effects of domestic threats on regime survival don't translate automatically into the decision to adopt a formal instrument like a democracy clause. decision makers' current perceptions and future expectations mediate between events and effective formalization. These asymmetric perceptions and expectations generate a tutelage relationship in which some decision makers perceive 26 their states as protectors and enforcers, while others see themselves as protected and demanders of a certain provision, such as a democracy clause. We operationalize tutelage in two final hypotheses.
first, actors have different perceptions of the relative stability of their own regimes, and these perceptions may influence their preference for adopting democracy clauses. given a certain critical domestic threat, governments that perceive themselves as unstable will demand the adoption of a democracy clause for the sake of its own usefulness, while governments that perceive themselves as stable will support such adoption as functional for others. although it's easy to deduce the motivation of less stable governments (that is, they want to shield themselves from domestic threats), the motivation of self-perceived stable governments can vary, combining utilitarian and normative reasons. accordingly, self-perceived stable governments can be moved by self-interest-wanting to promote a stable regional environment or to project an image of regional leadership.
30 But they may also be pursuing normative or ideational motivations, such as wanting to preserve a certain regional identity (for example, a concertation of consensusseeking and peaceful nations) 31 or to defend ideologically like-minded governments. 32 The following hypothesis captures the differences between these two types of actors-assuming that the motivations of selfperceived stable democracies can originate according to different forms of logic, while leading to the same outcome.
-H4a. decision makers formalize democracy clauses as functional for themselves or functional for others, depending on their self-perception of stability.
Second, government expectations of the future enforcement of such clauses-and not just current perceptions-can also influence the decision to adopt them.
33 enforcement expectations play a pivotal role when intergovernmental coordination, rather than supranational delegation, enforces binding institutional commitments. The distinction between these two types of institutional design is crucial when we move from the study of human rights protection to the study of democracy protection.
34 for instance, andrew moravcsik's thesis on the protection of human rights through the european convention on Human Rights relies on an institutional design in which states delegate authority to a court. When states delegate the implementation of a norm to a supranational body, such as a regional court or tribunal, its enforcement relies to a large extent on the body's capabilities. on the contrary, in intergovernmental designs like democracy clauses, enforcement becomes subject to interstate bargaining, and therefore asymmetric enforcement capabilities play a larger role. 35 existing cases of regional organizations' protection of democracy almost always rely on intergovernmental mechanisms. 36 larger states face easier enforcement conditions than do smaller ones. for the latter, enforcement on large states may be too costly. in fact, research into the enforcement of democracy-protection norms shows that the interests of regional powers-along with the external pressures of extraregional powers-and the presence of competing geopolitical interests are key factors in explaining variation in enforcement. 37 although this article doesn't address actual enforcement, we suspect that different enforcement expectations can influence the decision to adopt formal democracy clauses. actors anticipate enforcement probabilities and position themselves accordingly. Thus, governments facing domestic threats will support democracy clauses when they believe such clauses can be enforced for their protection. anticipating the possible need to enforce sanctions, decision makers in smaller member states would be relatively skeptical about their ability to do so, while governments in larger member states would feel confident about their ability to enforce democracy clauses should any breach of democracy happen in smaller and less stable members.
These likely enforcers-that is, the large and more stable member states-perceive themselves as protectors or guardians of smaller, less stable members, which creates a tutelage relationship. The argument is constructed on the theoretical insights derived from the european case in which the existence of consolidated democracies alongside less stable or new democracies led to the view that an agreement exists between these two groups of states as the basis of institutional formalization. 38 in an environment in which states with notable differences in size transited almost simultaneously from authoritarianism to democracy, the expectations of effective enforcement capability play a significant role in explaining formalization. accordingly, we propose this last hypothesis:
-H4b. decision makers will support or oppose the adoption of democracy clauses depending on their expectations regarding the future enforcement of these norms against their own countries.
summary of the hypotheses and observable implications even though these four theoretical explanations-diffusion, societal demand, regime survival, and tutelage-entail different assumptions and scholars see them as competing explanations of international norms adoption, we believe that the hypotheses don't necessarily exclude one another. on the one hand, more than one causal mechanism can intervene to explain why governments in a particular region adopt and formalize democracy-protection norms in the form of democracy clauses. on the other hand, actors often explain their decisions by appealing simultaneously to different explanatory factors with different theoretical foundations. explanations deriving from different theoretical approaches thus provide elements for explaining the outcome of interest: the adoption and formalization of democracy clauses. Table 1 summarizes the hypotheses and their respective observable implications-that is, the specific pieces of evidence we would observe if a specific hypothesis were confirmed. 39 research design, methods, and data This article investigates the adoption and formalization of democracy clauses in South american intergovernmental organizations. We follow the methodological and epistemological assumptions of process-tracing analysis. 40 Process tracing consists of the identification of "causal variables said to conduce to a specific type of outcome to be explained as well as an accompanying account, which may be more or less formal, about how those and other variables interact in the causal chain that leads to the outcome."
41 Process-tracing analysis seeks to explain a certain outcome of interest causally, rather than correlating the systematic variation of an independent and a dependent variable, as in covariation methods. in our case, the outcome to be explained is the adoption of formal democracy clauses. for each theory, we infer a hypothesis and its observable implications regarding this outcome as if each of the causal 39 checkel 2014. 40 collier 2011; Hall 2008; Beach and Pedersen 2013; Bennett and checkel 2014 . 41 Hall 2008, 309. factors were in place. Then we search for the evidence needed to discriminate between the competing explanations. 
Societal Demand
H2. Societal demand decision makers identify pressures from societal groups. They link the pro-market preferences of those groups to the adoption and formalization of democracy clauses.
Regime Survival
H3. Regime survival decision makers refer to fears that the government can be struck down. They causally link the decision to formalize democracy clauses to specific critical domestic threats to the government or the regime.
Tutelage
H4a. asymmetric self-perceptions decision makers explicitly state that democracy clauses were adopted and formalized because they were useful for certain countries and not others. actors perceive differences between countries and form their preferences for formalization accordingly. H4b. asymmetric enforcement expectations decision makers explicitly state that democracy clauses are enforceable only for certain countries and not others. They link the decision to formalize the clauses to those differences. even though the decisions to create these two regional organizations occurred against very different historical backgrounds, their democracy clauses are linked. in fact, unasur builds on and expands the mercosur acquis regarding democracy protection. furthermore, both groups created coordination mechanisms and have actually concerted their actions in cases of democratic crisis, such as the impeachment of President fernando lugo of Paraguay in 2012. finally, their membership overlaps-in fact, the unasur members associated with mercosur are also subscribed to the latter's democracy clause.
We selected these two organizations for two reasons. first, both have been particularly active in democracy protection and have been involved in most of the recent cases of crisis management in South america. mercosur intervened in four democracy-related crises in Paraguay (1996, 1999, 2000, and 2012 ) and unasur intervened in four other events (Bolivia 2008 , ecuador 2010 , Paraguay 2012 , and venezuela 2013 .
Second, mercosur and unasur are relatively unexplored cases of regional democracy governance; most literature on the subject is descriptive rather than explanatory. By exception, andrea Ribeiro Hoffmann and anna van der vleuten 44 identify causal explanations for the intervention by regional organizations, including mercosur and unasur. But they don't explain why regional organizations adopt democracy clauses, which is the primary object of this article. The limited range of studies contrasts with the relatively recent formalization of mercosur and unasur's respective clauses, which means that the key decision makers remain accessible. ours is the first article to research the motivations of decision makers to adopt democracy clauses in South america.
methods
We consider decision makers as the units for analysis. To generate evidence on the reasons for their decisions, we conducted semistructured interviews with them. Such interviews "shed light on the hidden elements of political action that are not clear from an analysis of political outcomes or other primary sources." 45 interviewees were allowed to express their views freely, which diminishes the margin for the interviewer to manipulate data by imposing interpretative schemes when asking questions. interviewees were also free to provide or to refrain from providing arguments that support any or none of the hypotheses informing the research. The actors' claims permit us to verify whether the actors' various actions and statements at each stage of the causal process are consistent with the image of the world implied by the theory. 46 The actors were also free to suggest alternative explanations. in practical terms, the question that informed the interviews was, "Why did you decide/agree to the formalization of this provision?"
We conducted thirty-six interviews with senior decision makers, including presidents, foreign ministers, secretaries of state, ambassadors, and other high officials within the national administrations (see annex i in the supplementary material for the list of interviews). 47 We selected the candidates by applying positional sampling, 48 using their participation in the design and adoption of the democracy-protection protocols in mercosur and unasur as the criteria for their inclusion. We conducted the interviews during two periods of fieldwork (in march and July 2015) in asunción, Buenos aires, florence, madrid, montevideo, Quito, Rio de Janeiro, and São Paulo. only one interviewee asked us to omit his name in the narratives; consequently, we removed his name from this article.
focusing on decision makers permits us to respond to the criticism usually leveled against using evidence obtained from interviews with other types of actors-such as practitioners and commentators-that is, drawing conclusions from the opinions of those not directly involved in the political process of interest. We deliberately asked our interviewees to focus on the original reasons and motivations behind their decision to adopt and formalize the clause. in so doing we sought to neutralize the bias behind many functionalist accounts that infer the actor's motivations from the effects and outcomes of a certain institution. 45 Tansey 2007, 767 . 46 Hall 2008, 311. 47 closa and Palestini 2018. 48 Tansey 2007. To ensure that our interpretation of the claims made by decision makers was as objective and as reproducible as possible, we codified the claims. codification yielded a set of 163 claims, which we analyzed using atlas.ti. We generated a codebook of first-and second-level codes (see annex ii in the supplementary material). 49 We deduced first-level codes from each hypothesis. We then disaggregated the first-level codes into several second-level codes, assisted by an inductive preliminary analysis of the interviews. We assigned the claims extracted from interviews to the second-level codes, which were in turn grouped and associated with the first-level codes. Both coauthors separately codified claims, after which we compared codifications. once we agreed on differences, we ran an intercoder reliability (replicability) test, asking an external observer to assign codes to the same set of 163 claims. We applied the Krippendorff 's alpha coefficient. The result (α ≥ 0.6849) locates our results above the lower threshold (α ≥ 0.667) and permits us to consider our interpretations reliable. 50 We also addressed potential biases and questions regarding the reliability of the interview data, since doubts can arise about the value of the actors' subjective interpretations. We asked some interviewees about decisions made fifteen or twenty years ago, running the risk that their recollections could be biased by potential imprecisions and lacunae. additionally, cases of enforcement of these provisions may affect the actors' perceptions. To reduce these potential reliability problems, we also interviewed a number of academics to obtain background information that helped identify potential contradictions or inaccuracies. But claims from academic sources are not part of the data set reported in annex iii (see the supplementary material).
51 as another way to verify accounts and detect eventual mistakes in the actors' recollections, we triangulated the interview information with written primary sources (newspapers and memoirs) and bibliographies that consider the relevant events. annex iii provides all the quotations and maps them to their corroborative citations. Quotations are listed in footnotes by the name of the interviewee, date of interview, and the number of the selected text quoted in the transcript of that interview (for example, "Sanguinetti 2015 (1)" refers to the first of the selected quotations for Julio maria Sanguinetti). annex iii lists all the quotations referenced in this article, so that any specific one can be easily traced to the corresponding interviewee.
drawing inference from empirical data on hypotheses given that decision makers were the unit of analysis, we made it a condition that a hypothesis would be confirmed when at least three actors from three different member states coincided in their stated reasons for a decision. Since mercosur had four member states at the time of completing this research, it created a relatively robust requirement. additionally, we considered as confirmatory any cases in which no contrary evidence (that is, actors explicitly arguing against a specific hypothesis) was found. The number of claims alone doesn't provide strong evidence because a single actor can repeat the same claim a number of times. The table in annex iv presents the occurrence of actors, claims, and states with an illustrative value.
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analysis and results governments originally created mercosur and unasur without democracy clauses and formalized these provisions later on. mercosur originated mainly as a trade-integration project in 1991; its presidents committed themselves informally to democracy protection through presidential declarations-such as the declarations of las leñas in 1993 and Potrero de los funes in 1996, 53 which lacked binding effect. in 1998 mercosur adopted a democracy clause, the Protocol of ushuaia (ushuaia i), signed by the four mercosur member states and two associated states, Bolivia and chile. These governments adhered to a liberal understanding of democracy.
in 2011 a second mercosur democracy clause, the Protocol of montevideo (ushuaia ii) enlarged the list of signatories by adding venezuela, colombia, ecuador, and Peru, thus comprising all of South america's geographical territory except guyana and Surinam. ushuaia ii added the identification of possible threats to the existing effective breaches as causes for activation, and included a list of sanctions. like its predecessor, ushuaia ii required unanimity to enter into force; the Paraguayan Senate's objection to the sanctions and their potentially disruptive impact on the country has impeded its ratification (as of march 2018).
The preamble of unasur's 2008 constitutive treaty referred only informally to democracy protection. Two years later, the Protocol of georgetown formalized the commitment into a democracy clause that made reference to threats and sanctions. distinct from the two mercosur protocols, the Protocol of georgetown required ratification by nine member states to enter into force, which occurred in 2014. as of march 2018, Paraguay was the only country that hadn't ratified the protocol.
ushuaia ii and the Protocol of georgetown share many characteristics, even having the same wording in some provisions.
54 in contrast to the signatories of ushuaia i, the governments that negotiated and signed both ushuaia ii and the Protocol of georgetown adhered to various political ideologies, ranging from center-right neoliberal governments (colombia, chile, and Peru) to socialist Bolivarian governments (Bolivia, ecuador, and venezuela). in turn, when ushuaia ii was signed, the governments of all four mercosur member states considered themselves left wing.
testing diffusion hypotheses according to the normative emulation hypothesis (H1a), decision makers formalize democracy clauses to adhere to global norms and values. in fact, decision makers referred to the existence of a normative background-the 1991 oas Santiago declaration, the 1992 oas Washington Protocol, and the 1996 eu Treaty of amsterdam-in the early stage of informal commitments to democracy protection, before formalizing the clauses. Thus, some decision makers explained informal collective declarations, such as the las leñas declaration, by referring to these other norms, 55 presenting it as the morally correct thing to do. 56 But actors didn't construct a causal connection between such a normative background and the formalization of the democracy clauses. in other words, normative emulation had an influence only on the early 1990s mercosur presidential declarations, which lacked obligation (binding force) and enforcement capacity. as we discuss below, these declarations escalated into full-fledged operational and enforceable mechanisms for other reasons.
according to the direct-influence diffusion hypothesis (H1b), decision makers would identify the incentives, pressure, or persuasion exercised by external actors as the cause for formalization of democracy clauses. We found no evidence to support this hypothesis. decision makers alluded to external organizations, such as the eu, but none of them mentioned that external actors used any incentives, sanctions, or persuasion to motivate the adoption of these protocols. This negative finding stands in sharp contrast to the eu's imposition of democracyprotection clauses in the bilateral association and strategic partnership agreements negotiated with certain South american countries. only former chilean foreign minister and oas general Secretary José miguel insulza claimed that the negotiations of South american countries with the eu prompted the mercosur Protocol of ushuaia.
57 He made that claim emphatically, but no other actor backed this view.
in a nutshell, diffusion theories don't explain the decision by South american organizations to adopt democracy clauses. The evidence collected supports only a normative emulation in the early stages of the institutionalization process (informal declarations).
testing the societal-demand hypothesis according to the societal-demand hypothesis (H2), decision makers translate the pressure from domestic actors in favor of a liberal economic order into the formalization of democracy clauses. a priori, this hypothesis stands out as a powerful explanation of democracy-clause adoption in the region. in fact, both the mercosur las leñas declaration (1992) and article 1 of the Protocol of ushuaia contain the same wording, making "the maintenance of democracy an 'indispensable' condition for the development of the integration process." This specific sentence lends credibility to the hypothesis that liberal pro-market preferences stemming from societal constituencies are being defended. and in fact, the integration process was a highly liberalizing one in the early stages of mercosur. nevertheless, there's no evidence that the preferences of certain domestic groups on issues like free trade inspired decision makers to draft these provisions or influenced them during the drafting process. nor is there evidence that the drafters took these preferences into account. 58 This finding coincides with the rather secondary role assigned to interest groups in more general studies on the design of the mercosur institutions.
59
The collected evidence doesn't just disconfirm any role for pro-market societal groups; it also questions the very theoretical foundation of this hypothesis. on the one hand, some of the most liberal and free trademinded decision makers, such as uruguay's President luís alberto 57 according to insulza, the eu also had a causal effect on the adoption of the oas Resolution 1080. insulza 2015 (6 and 7). chile, however, was not part of mercosur and despite the country's later adherence, insulza's views do not convey an insider's view of the negotiations. lacalle, showed open distrust and lack of confidence in the value of democracy clauses. 60 on the other hand, and more decisively, the upgrading of the provisions and the formalization of ushuaia ii and the Protocol of georgetown coincided with a shift in regional integration in latin america toward a model that precisely questioned and rejected liberal market-led integration. 61 decision makers consistently pointed toward the ideological change to explain both the creation of unasur and the politization of mercosur. This change amounted to a robust criticism and rejection of liberalism. The change also defined the ideological environment in which both the georgetown and ushuaia ii protocols were negotiated.
62 against this shifting landscape, certain liberal and trade-oriented groups in countries like Brazil began to demand withdrawal from mercosur and to search for alternative trade relationships.
63
testing the regime-survival hypothesis Regime survival plays a central causal role in the narratives of decision makers. consistent with the literature on international democracyprotection institutions, several decision makers linked the institutionalization of mercosur in the 1990s with the reduction of political uncertainty throughout the "transition to democracy" process. 64 But decision makers didn't refer to regime survival as an abstract possibility. When asked about the formalization of the Protocol of ushuaia, they explicitly linked the protocol with regime protection in one specific member, Paraguay.
65 actors refer to the "lock-in" effect of the democracy clauses, 66 and more precisely, to the lock-in effect in relation to their sanctioning capacity. decision makers involved in the adoption of the protocols of ushuaia ii and georgetown also provided evidence supporting the regime-survival hypothesis. in this case, though, formalizing these clauses was a response to the widespread unconventional threats to left-wing governments. Those governments increased the dissuasive potential of the clauses through the formalization of stronger sanctions.
67 most of the decision makers said that specific "critical domestic threats" had immediately triggered formalization of the democracy clauses in both mercosur and unasur.
evidence from non-Paraguayan 68 and Paraguayan decision makers The coup in Honduras, for example, was considered a "wake-up call" 74 or "an event that switched on the lights."
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Taken together, the events threatening incumbent governments increased the perception of political uncertainty, thus spurring the formalization of democracy clauses in South america. The succession of domestic threats in several countries explains why mercosur and unasur formalized both the protocols of ushuaia ii and georgetown so quickly (in less than two years). figure 1 shows the temporal association between domestic threats and instruments.
Therefore, the regime-survival hypothesis (H3) stands as a powerful explanation for the adoption of democracy clauses.
testing the tutelage hypotheses did all states perceive the increasing political uncertainty equally? according to H4a, self-perceptions regarding political stability, and consequently the asymmetric need for protection among member states, explain the formalization of democracy clauses. We expected that decision makers who perceive their states as stable would argue that they didn't need these provisions for themselves, and conversely, that their adoption responded to the needs of other, less stable states. in turn, countries that suffered domestic threats, such as Paraguay, ecuador, and Bolivia, would have been perceived as the addressees of these provisions. We would also expect that decision makers from these countries would have coincided in perceiving these provisions as instrumental for themselves.
our findings strongly support this hypothesis. as required by our validation test, decision makers from the three other mercosur members argued that Paraguay needed the protocols of ushuaia and ushuaia ii.
76 decision makers from Paraguay coincided in their views, strongly agreeing that they required the protocols because they were useful for their own country. 77 our findings also confirm that decision makers coincided in identifying which countries did not need the provision. neither Brazilian, 78 uruguayan, 79 nor chilean actors 80 perceived the protocols as necessary for protecting their democratic regimes. decision makers also coincided in identifying the countries that didn't need democracy protection at all: they excluded argentina, Brazil, and uruguay as potential addressees of the protocols. 81 The interviews consistently repeated this pattern.
our theoretical expectations also hold for unasur's Protocol of georgetown, which basically repeates the pattern observed for mercosur. unasur's protocol differed in that it comprised an enlarged number of potential addressees (related to its broader membership); interviewees often mentioned Paraguay 82 as needing the protocols, along with two other countries, Bolivia and ecuador, where domestic threats occurred between 2008 and 2010. 83 decision makers suggested the emergence of a new notion of regional instability that justified the formalization of democracy clauses. 84 again we find the same pattern-decision makers who perceived their states as more stable dismissed the functional value of the protocol for their own countries. Thus both argentinian 85 and uruguayan 86 decision makers discounted the relevance of unasur's Protocol of georgetown in protecting their regimes, but still supported its adoption as functional for protecting other countries.
according to our expectations, perceptions regarding the instrumental value of a democracy clause vary among members of the same organization. Some governments perceived the clauses as functional for their own democratic stability, while others felt them to be functional for other states believed to be less stable and needing tutelage. governments in specific countries maintained stable perceptions of whether they needed those clauses, irrespective of the ideological u-turn that affected most states in the region during the first decade of the 2000s. Paraguayan actors thus demanded tutelage both with liberal centerright governments (Wasmosy) and left-wing governments (lugo). argentina, Brazil, and uruguay perceived themselves as providers of tutelage whether they were governed by center-right or center-left liberal governments (respectively, carlos menem, fernando Henrique cardoso, and Julio maría Sanguinetti) or by left-wing governments (cristina fernández de Kirchner, luiz inácio lula da Silva and Rousseff, and José mujica).
But the relative perceptions of the need for these clauses don't exhaust the explanations for their formalization. according to the asymmetric enforcement-expectations hypothesis (H4b), we expected that decision makers would refer to their enforcement capability to explain their preference for formalized clauses. decision makers from smaller member states, such as Paraguay and uruguay, would be skeptical of their ability to enforce these provisions against larger member states like argentina and Brazil. our evidence also supports this hypothesis. decision makers generally understood that the intergovernmental character of the democracy clauses (and of mercosur and unasur) meant that enforcement depended on the states themselves.
87 actors perceived enforcing these provisions against smaller member states, such as Paraguay, guyana, and Surinam, as possible and credible.
88 in parallel, none believed it possible or credible that they could enforce the provisions against larger member states, singling out Brazil in this connection.
89 decision makers identified Brazil as the country with the largest enforcement capability, 90 while Paraguay featured prominently as a recipient.
91 Surprisingly, although we might expect such asymmetry to cast doubt on the very enforceability of the clauses, only one decision maker (and one advisor) referred to the clauses as "rhetorical commitments."
92 The interviewees held the same enforcement expectations for mercosur's and unasur's clauses, and their expectations did not vary when the government's ideological orientation changed. in summary, the conception of democracy clauses as tutelage mechanisms by which member states that are larger or perceived as more stable may oversee member states that are smaller and perceived as less stable emerges as one of the most solid findings. 87 only one interviewee expressed this implicit belief; conde 2015 (29, 30, and 43) . discussion our findings show that South american governments adopted formal democracy clauses as instruments intended to reduce political uncertainty and to ensure regime survival. Political uncertainty doesn't relate to the age of the democracy 93 -since South american states transited to democracy at more or less the same time-but rather to concrete domestic threats. our findings coincide with previous work in showing that governments that support the adoption of democracy clauses do so to secure the survival of their own regimes. 94 moreover, our findings also show that the asymmetric perceptions and expectations of states mediated the decision to adopt democracy clauses, an aspect hitherto overlooked by the literature on international democracy and human rights-protection regimes. Perceptions differ in relation to the need for protecting democracy (as the regime-survival hypothesis predicts), and also on their relative capability to enforce these mechanisms. unlike human rights protection, which depends on supranational regimes that delegate power to the courts, democracy protection depends strictly on intergovernmental mechanisms. Hence, enforcement rests on the will and the capabilities of member states. The expectations held by governments regarding each other's future enforcement capabilities become crucial to the decision to formalize a democracy clause.
our findings show two different types of perceptions. governments that perceive themselves as relatively stable and expect that the enforcement of a clause against their own country is unlikely tend to support the adoption of a democracy clause inasmuch as it is functional for other countries. for this group of governments, there's no trade-off between tying their hands and sovereignty losses because they don't expect the clause will affect their sovereignty in any significant way. moreover, these governments see themselves as the enforcers of the clause, exerting tutelage over their smaller, less stable neighbors. Their reasons could be instrumental, such as securing the regional environment, as much as ideational, such as a commitment to specific understandings of democracy.
Those governments under the tutelage of the enforcers have the opposite view. Because their countries have experienced critical destabilization, the members of this group perceive themselves as unstable, and therefore expect that a democracy clause will have a dissuasive 93 effect against potential aggressors, reinforcing regime survival. for these countries under tutelage, the potential loss of sovereignty through monitoring or sanctioning does exist, but is outweighed by the need to curb domestic threats.
These findings decisively support our tutelage theory, showing that not all regional organization member states want or need to tie their hands in the same way, and that they're fully aware that the enforcement of the newly adopted norms is credible against some countries and not others. among our findings, we were struck by the awareness of and crudity with which decision makers referred to the asymmetries among states and the impact of those asymmetries on their decision to formalize clauses.
We were also struck by the way government preferences remain relatively stable irrespective of ideological change. in fact, the governments that participated in the adoption of ushuaia i in 1998 were ideologically at odds with those participating in the adoption of the protocols of georgetown and ushuaia ii in 2010-11. But our findings lead us to relativize the effect of ideological change on the preferences of governments at the moment of deciding whether to turn an informal commitment into a formal democracy clause. Thus, self-perceived enforcers remained constant despite an ideological change in government. The governments of cardoso (center-right) and lula da Silva and Rousseff (left) in Brazil, as well as the governments of menem (center-right) and Kirchner (left) in argentina, shared similar perceptions of their enforcement role and the value of these provisions for themselves. a similar case can be made for those states whose governments perceived the provisions as necessary for them: Paraguayan presidents Wasmosy (center-right) and lugo (left) behaved as demanders of ushuaia i and ushuaia ii, respectively. Tutelage influenced the decision to adopt democracy clauses despite ideological differences.
But we cannot dismiss the role that ideological affinity may have had on the actual decision to enforce the clauses (and especially the sanctions they comprised). Two cases of enforcement of the suspension clause of ushuaia i suggest that ideology may play a role in the clauses' implementation. in the first case, mercosur governments suspended a center-right government in Paraguay in 2012 after the impeachment procedure against lugo's left-wing government, which was ideologically aligned with the governments of the other three member states. The opposite is true for the second case. in 2017, mercosur suspended the left-wing government of venezuela's nicolás maduro after centerright governments took power in argentina and Brazil and persuaded the undecided left-wing government in uruguay to support suspension. But the politics of enforcement shouldn't be conflated with the politics of adoption of democracy clauses, which is the primary subject of this article. for the latter, regime survival and tutelage remain the most relevant explanatory factors.
conclusions
This article has investigated the reasons for and motivations behind the decision to formalize informal commitments to respect democracy into democracy clauses codified by the legal instruments of mercosur and unasur. We have sought to contribute to theory building by testing and refining competitive explanatory accounts drawn from current theories in the broader field of international institutions for democracy and human rights protection. Studying the reasons for the formalization of mechanisms to protect democracy in cases of regional organizations that are different from the european ones contributes to liberating theorization from the dominance of eurocentrism. in this respect, our research represents a stepping stone on the path to asserting comparative regional governance as a field whose empirical referents, and hence theorization, bypass the temptation to make the european case the model for others-a tendency denounced by several theorists.
95
This article also contributes to mainstreaming regionalism.
96 cases different from the european one don't need to claim idiosyncratic factors to explain evidence, and in fact, this evidence can robustly contribute to theorization with global ambition.
We conclude that diffusion mechanisms have a marginal causal effect on the decisions made by South american governments to adopt democracy clauses. The global script of democracy-protection norms certainly created a favorable milieu for the discussion of democracy at the international forums of regional organizations like oas, and in our case, mercosur. normative emulation led to informal and nonbinding presidential declarations, but it did not cause the adoption of formal and binding clauses. likewise, though South american political actors look to other regional organizations, such as the eu and the oas, as inspiration when drafting the texts of their democracy clauses, those organizations did not have a direct effect on the decision to formalize these clauses. This finding questions the normative power argument that's been so common, especially in eu external relations studies. The regime-survival theory seems better equipped than diffusion theories to explain the adoption of democracy clauses in South america. our findings show that decision makers consented to formalizing democracy clauses to reduce political uncertainty stemming from concrete domestic threats. The succession of such threats, first in 1996-98 (the adoption of ushuaia i), and then between 2008 and 2013 (the period of adoption of both the unasur Protocol of georgetown and the mercosur Protocol of montevideo-ushuaia ii), enhanced the probabilities for further institutionalization of democracy-protection norms.
We have further refined the regime-survival explanation by introducing the notion of tutelage, and by paying systematic attention to the asymmetries among states in self-perceptions and enforcement expectations. We've shown that the way governments perceive their own stability, as well as their expectations regarding the future enforcement of a norm, are causally linked to the decision to support the formalization of democracy clauses. These asymmetric perceptions create a tutelage relationship in which some countries are perceived as enforcers and protectors, while others are seen as those to be protected. any such tutelage relationship remained relatively stable regardless of the change in the ideological orientation of the region's governments. in a regional environment in which most states (with a few exceptions) transited from authoritarianism to democracy simultaneously, size considerations became more evident as a relevant explanatory factor. This finding may pass relatively unnoticed in environments with sharp differences in terms of democratic consolidation.
our findings open the way to future avenues of research. The interplay between these self-perceptions and expectations and domestic politics must be better specified. domestic politics are relevant for the formalization of democracy clauses insofar as the national parliaments must ratify the decisions made by the heads of state. accordingly, legislative debates need to be researched. Research is also needed to specify the role of these asymmetric perceptions and expectations-and the ensuing tutelage relationship-during the enforcement of the clauses. Recent cases of the enforcement of mercosur and unasur clauses indicate that ideological affinity may play an important role in explaining states' attitudes toward enforcement and, particularly, sanctions.
finally, the generalization of our findings must be tested through analysis of the adoption and formalization processes of democracy clauses by other regional organizations not only in latin america, but also in other regional contexts, such as africa. Special attention must be paid to the factors that explain the adoption of overlapping democracy protection regimes, and their effects on the legitimacy and efficacy of those provisions.
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